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Philosophy of Education: Becoming Less
Western, More African?
PENNY ENSLIN AND KAI HORSTHEMKE
Posing the question ‘How diverse is philosophy of education in
the West?’ this paper responds to two recent defences of
African philosophy of education which endorse its
communitarianism and oppose individualism in Western
philosophy of education. After outlining Thaddeus Metz’s
argument that Western philosophy of education should become
more African by being more communitarian, and Yusef
Waghid’s defence of communitarianism in African philosophy
of education, we develop a qualified defence of aspects of
individualism in education. Our reservations about some
aspects of communitarianism lead us to argue for a role for
some forms of individualism in African as well as Western
education. Finally, reflecting on what is at stake in this kind of
comparative philosophy of education, we argue that an
over-emphasis on cultural differences can distract
philosophers of education from the attention they should pay
to the common dangers posed across continents by the
influence of global capitalism on education.
1. THE VIEW FROM THEWEST
The fiftieth anniversary celebration of the Philosophy of Education Society
of Great Britain (PESGB) is an apt moment to take stock of the state of
philosophy of education in Great Britain and in the wider world—both the
West and globally. On the evidence of its Journal and its conference papers,
the discipline as practiced in this Society enjoys greater diversity than it
did in its early years in the heyday of analytic philosophy of education.
Its members are now much more likely to be attuned to Continental phi-
losophy, and so it is more broadly Western than it was 50 years ago. But
what of its relationship with other, different ‘philosophies’ or approaches
to philosophy of education not historically located in Britain, or the West
(sometimes referred to as the ‘North’)? That relationship is, inevitably, com-
plex and controversial—not least because philosophy of education will, like
all intellectual endeavours, be implicated in the colonial and neo-colonial
relationships that mark Western intellectuals’ engagement with the global
South.
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In this paper our focus will be on philosophy of education in Africa,
though some of the issues we will discuss would apply too to other parts of
the world where philosophy of education is also a historical product of pre-
colonial traditions, colonial imposition of Western models of schooling—
itself an instrument of subjugation and government of the natives by Britain
and other colonial powers—and latterly a combination of post-colonial re-
sistance and neo-colonial policy borrowing. The very fact of post-colonial
disparities in funding of schooling, higher education and research perpetu-
ates deep inequities affecting the conditions under whichWestern andmany
African scholars are able to pursue the sort of debate we discuss here. To
some extent these factors may account for the reduced representation of
philosophical work on education that stems from outside the West, under-
stood largely as Europe and North America, in spite of the greater pluralism
that philosophy of education demonstrates now than it did when the PESGB
was founded.
African philosophy of education, however, is well represented in thework
of Thaddeus Metz and Yusef Waghid. While we do not assume common
cause across the board in thework of these proponents ofAfrican philosophy
of education, we select their treatment of an apparent central difference
betweenWestern and African philosophy of education as giving expression
to a widely held view. In exploring this stance we set out to take stock of
where an on-going debate has reached, ultimately posing the question of
what is really at stake and what way forward there might be across key
differences in clarifying a way ahead for a globally aware philosophy of
education.
In recent work (Metz, 2015; Waghid, 2014) both Metz and Waghid de-
scribe and defend African philosophy of education.1 Stated in summary
form for the moment, Metz’s critique of Western philosophy of education
argues that ‘the Western is individualist and the African is communitar-
ian’ and ‘the West should become less Western’ (Metz, 2015, pp. 1–2)
by being less individualistic and more communitarian. Waghid’s project
is to argue for an African philosophy of education guided by communi-
tarian, reasonable and culture-dependent action. In responding to both we
focus in particular on the contrast they draw between Western individual-
ism and African communitarianism. We begin (sections 2 and 3) with an
account of the positions they take in favour of African communitarianism
and against Western individualism. Our reconsideration of individualism
(section 4) highlights critical opposition in Western philosophy of educa-
tion to the forms of individualism rightly opposed by Metz and Waghid,
as well as pointing out both a communitarian presence in Western philos-
ophy of education and its generally critical opposition to many aspects of
schooling as practiced in the West. Reservations about some aspects of
African communtarianism lead us (section 5) to argue for a necessary role
for some elements of the individualist tradition. Finally, asking what is at
stake in this kind of comparative philosophy of education (section 6), we
argue that an over-emphasis on cultural differences across continents dis-
tracts philosophers of education from the shared dangers of the influence of
global capitalism on schooling.
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2. THE WEST AS INDIVIDUALIST, THE AFRICAN AS
COMMUNITARIAN
Metz appears to be advancing both an empirical argument, the conclusion
of which constitutes the first premise of his overall argument, and a more
normative argument, the conclusion ofwhich constitutes the second premise
of his overall argument, before he arrives at a normative conclusion.
The Empirical Argument
 Western philosophies of education are individualist.
 Sub-Saharan African philosophies of education are communitarian.
 Therefore, there is a noticeable contrast between philosophies of edu-
cation typical in the West and in sub-Saharan Africa.
The Normative Argument
 There are attractive facets of sub-Saharan African communitarianism.
 On reflection, these facets outweigh the attractive facets of Western
individualism.
 Therefore, communitarian rather than individualist facets should in-
form education.
The Overall Argument
 There is a noticeable contrast between philosophies of education typi-
cal in the West and in sub-Saharan Africa.
 Given their overriding attractiveness, communitarian rather than indi-
vidualist facets should inform education.
 Therefore, education in the West and in societies influenced by the
West should become less Western, in order to accommodate these
facets.
Let us accept Metz’s empirical conclusion, though we find its claims
rather stark. Our doubts grow, as we will show, in considering his norma-
tive argument, and we disagree with his overall conclusion. While in the
paper we discuss here much of his attention is focused on characterising the
Western, we note that Metz here contrasts its thinly relational educational
practices and philosophy of education to the rich sense of sociality charac-
teristic of African society. On his account, drawing on some pre-colonial
practices, African educational ends emphasise learning the community’s
customs, the acquisition of moral personhood, work-based learning as
preparation for work that supports the community and its development,
and dialogue. We accept the attribution, for the moment, of communitari-
anism to African philosophies of education, but not the associated claim of
an absence of communitarian elements fromWestern philosophy of educa-
tion. But we will argue that Metz’s treatment of individualism as a recurrent
tendency, a blind spot in Western philosophy of education, is too inclined
to emphasise some particular brands of individualism and to ignore those
that are both compatible with its communitarian strands and embedded in
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debates about the aims, or what Metz calls the final ends, of education in
Western philosophy of education.
Metz’s description of individualism in Western educational thought and
practice asserts that Euro-American theory is inclined to value qualities that
are internal to persons, i.e. their rationality, autonomy, desires, pleasures
and self-esteem—education that is focused on an individual person seeking
self-realisation and who is located at a distance from other persons. In
philosophy of education in the West and educational practice in the United
Kingdom, in Europe and in North America, the ends of education refer to
internal properties,
such as her autonomy, rationality, intellectual virtues, self-develop-
ment, self-esteem, pleasure, desires and work-related abilities. It is
extraordinarily common to find Western normative theorists main-
taining that the ultimate aim of education should be to enable the
young to judge their traditions, to think critically, to freely pursue a
conception of the good, to realise themselves and so on. Individual
agency has become the name of the game (Metz, 2015, p. 4).
Metz claims that the individualistic ends of education in the West have
characteristically been pursued in school buildings dedicated to this pur-
pose by professional teachers who impart propositional knowledge that is
inclined to be established by argumentation, through a curriculum that is
both set and tending to focus on written texts. Assessment through testing
aims to certify individuals for a market in which they can compete for jobs.
As we will show in section 4 below, this characterisation does not match our
reading ofWestern philosophy of education and its relationship to schooling
practices in the West.
3. AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: ON BEING HUMAN
In his new book, Waghid (2014) undertakes to defend ‘an African phi-
losophy of education guided by communitarian, reasonable and culture-
dependent action’ (p. 1), by drawing ‘on a communitarian understanding
of the notion of ubuntu (African humanness and interdependence)’ (p. 2).
He takes ubuntu to offer a medium not only for the enactment of African
philosophy of education but also for its contribution ‘towards achieving
democratic justice on the African continent’ (p. 2). The main argument of
the book is that ‘an African philosophy of education as a practice has three
constitutive aspects: first, to be reasonable in one’s articulations; second, to
demonstrate moral maturity; and third, to be attuned to deliberation’ (p. 5),
i.e. to ‘consensual’ and ‘deliberative dialogue’ (pp. 9, 13).
The idea of African philosophising (e.g. about education) as a com-
munitarian practice is widely shared (see Wiredu, 2004). Yet, Waghid
wishes to reject an unfeasibly exclusive reading of African philosophy,
Africanisation and African indigenous knowledge. ‘What needs to be fore-
grounded is knowledge that harmonises the universal (say, what comes from
Europe) and the particular (traditional thoughts and practices . . . )’
(Waghid, 2014, p. 3). He is similarly careful to avoid any simplistic
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contraposition of communitarianism and individualism, community and
individual:
African philosophy of education as a communitarian practice does not
dismiss the individual per se. In other words, the favouring of commu-
nity should not necessarily be understood as being at the expense of
the individual. Rather, it invokes an understanding of education that
considers an individual’s aspirations and actions as constitutive, as an
extension of the community, and not in conflict with the latter (p. 5).
Setting out to avoid any dualistic opposition between the individual and the
community and insisting that African philosophy of education is not ‘about
renouncing the individual in favour of community’ (p. 5), Waghid draws
on the work of Michael Sandel (1982), Michael Walzer (1983) and Charles
Taylor (e.g. 1991) as communitarian philosophers to develop his account
of individualism, suggesting some complementarity between Western and
African communitarianism. His critique focuses on ‘the abstract, atomistic
and individualist aspirations of people associated with parochial liberalist
thought’ (p. 22), by contrast with the emphasis on the social, relational,
communal human self preferred by communitarians. In this vein, Waghid
describes African philosophy of education as ‘most favourably positioned
to be attentive to communal human aspirations that allow space for the
enactment of human freedom, autonomy and the cultivation of shared,
common goods’ (p. 22).
Waghid contrasts thisAfrican conception of the interactive, enriching, en-
during and intrinsic relationship between the individual and the community
(p. 45) with the atomic individual, sometimes associated with a narcissistic
self as the darker side of individualism. By flattening and narrowing lives,
this type of individualism leaves the self the poorer for being unconnected,
less concerned with others. This disengaged self seeks self fulfilment and
is ‘primarily concerned with the right of individuals to develop their own
form of life, grounded on their own sense of what is really important or
of value for themselves’ (Waghid, 2014, p. 47, citing Taylor, 1991, p. 14).
Waghid illustrates this concern by reference to teachers whomake their own
interests their priority, imposing them on their students (Waghid, 2014,
p. 48), as well as prioritising individual autonomy ahead of collectivism
(p. 47).
To his criticisms of atomistic and narcissistic individualismWaghid adds
a third category of individualism (drawing on Kymlicka, 1989): possessive
individualism, which ‘suggests that what people (individuals) want in life
is to maximise their share of social resources and material goods, rather
than promote the good of others or their own spiritual well-being’ (Waghid,
2014, p. 47). For atomists, an individual’s capacity for meaningful choice
is self-sufficient outside of society and culture.
To the alleged atomistic, narcissistic and possessive individualism of the
West, Waghid contrasts three constitutive aspects of African philosophy
of education as a practice: reasonableness, moral maturity and deliberation.
Each is given a communitarian interpretation, in associationwith his defence
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of the notion of ubuntu, as African interdependence and humaneness, a
humanistic concept that emphasises harmony, cooperation, care and respect
(p. 2).
Waghid’s approach to ‘reasonableness’, defining ‘rational justifications’
in terms of ‘what people offer as reasons for their beliefs, practices and insti-
tutions’ (p. 4), endorses Kwame Gyekye’s view that ‘African philosophical
discourse is embedded in two interrelated processes: rational discourse and
the application of a minimalist logic in ordinary conversations without be-
ing conversant with its formal rules’ (Gyekye, 1997, p. 29; Waghid, 2014,
p. 7; see also Waghid, 2014, p. 25ff.):
An African philosophy of education is not concerned mainly with
validity of the belief or story, but with the procedure according to
which the story is narrated—with lucidity and argumentation that will
present reasons for one’s views. While these reasons might not always
appeal to the understanding of those who listen, or listeners might
contest the logic of the narrations, the existence and proliferation of
these beliefs must be understood within the context of a particular
life-world (Waghid, 2014, p. 7).
Like the other constitutive aspects of African philosophy of education,
rationality receives a communitarian interpretation and is described as a
critical response to problems in African society. For Gyekye, ‘rationality
is a culture-dependent concept’ (Gyekye, 1997; Waghid, 2014, p. 7), so
that rationality as understood in Western culture may not be applicable in
Africa.2
Explaining the notion of moral maturity by drawing on Kwasi Wiredu’s
ideas (2004), Waghid refers to ‘an educated person’ as someone
who has attainedmoralmaturity and refinement . . . . Such a person has
acquired the virtues of honesty, faithfulness and duty to, and empathy
for the well-being of others in her community. This implies that an
educated person has developed a sense of responsibility towards her
kin and community (2014, p. 8; emphasis added).
Acquiring a sense of empathy, responsibility towards others in the com-
munity is a precondition for both personhood and for being an educated per-
son. Moral maturity in African education, as a moral discourse in itself, also
embraces sincerity, justice, moral sensitivity, responsibility and courage.
These virtues, cultivated by an African philosophy of education, aim to em-
power communities towards educational development which can address
the ‘African predicament’, ameliorating ‘ . . . poverty, hunger, famine, un-
employment, political oppression, civil wars, colonialism (imperialism) and
economic exploitation . . . ’ (Waghid, 2014, p. 8, citing Oladipo, 1992).
As the third constituent of the social practice of African philosophy of
education, Waghid includes deliberation and ‘consensual dialogue’ (p. 9)
as a significant if not essential component of African philosophy of edu-
cation (see Wiredu, 2004, p. 21). In deliberation thus interpreted, Waghid
emphasises listening respectfully to the other, however inarticulately they
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may express themselves, or how apparently irrelevant or ill-informed their
contribution might seem to the listener. In sub-Saharan Africa, consensus
is commonly perceived as desirable, and dissensus as undesirable, both on
epistemic and political grounds. In traditional African societies, debate char-
acteristically continues until a compromise is attained and all participants
agree with the outcome (Metz, 2007, p. 324).
4. INDIVIDUALISM RECONSIDERED
Both Metz and Waghid contrast the preferred communitarian character of
African education with individualism, which Metz more explicitly asso-
ciates with both philosophy of education and educational practice in the
West. Their critique of individualism focuses fundamentally on the idea
of the atomistic individual, critical and autonomous, detached from others,
pursuing her own desires and pleasures—and on educational practices that
set out to foster such an individual.
We will return to the topic of Western educational practice shortly, but
need first to question this characterisation of Western philosophy of edu-
cation. Whatever its collective failings might be, Western philosophy of
education is at the very least much more varied in its preoccupations and
opinions of the aims of education than this description suggests.3 Taking
writings in Britain alone as an example, while autonomy has featured promi-
nently in extensive debates about aims of education, there is no shortage
of those who have been sceptical about the idea that it should be viewed
as an aim of education, let alone its sole aim. Even Robert Dearden’s in-
fluential essay ‘Autonomy and Education’ (1972) tempers his defence of
a Kantian notion of autonomy with important qualifications, including that
autonomous choices are not made in isolation from others, and that sup-
porting autonomy does not assume unbridled freedom to do whatever one
likes. JohnWhite’s work has defended autonomy interpreted in an enlarged
sense, as moral autonomy that includes the good of others (1982). Richard
Smith’s scepticism about the usefulness of the idea of autonomy (1997)
challenges a tendency to think about persons atomistically instead of in
groups. But Smith is far from alone in this scepticism—and he expresses
it from within Western philosophy of education. As further evidence of
the vigorous debate in the West about the aims of education, in his essay
‘Education without Aims?’ Paul Standish (1999) is both struck by the pre-
occupation among philosophers of education with autonomy as an aim of
education and also prompted to ask whether there must be aims. In doing
so Standish is alert to the debasement of educational aims by concerns with
‘accountability, quality assurance, objectives, performativity . . . ’ (p. 49).
While some philosophers of education writing in theWest would endorse
a form of autonomy as one of the aims of education (and we note that on
Waghid’s account autonomy is allowed a role in association with common
goods and communal aspirations), they would almost without exception
share Standish’s concern about the debasement of education by the influ-
ence of performativity on schooling, including higher education. In doing
so their criticisms of education as practiced in the West and elsewhere have
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much in common with Metz’s concerns about pursuit of the ends of edu-
cation through institutionalised schooling that aims at certifying persons to
compete for jobs in the labour market, relying in doing so on assessment by
testing.4 Yet, although forms of testing of the kind Metz rightly opposes are
increasingly corrupting of education globally, we would want to argue that
some forms of assessment are less so, especially if formatively offered in
ways that are less closely hitched to extrinsic ends like employability and if
they are more individualistic, in the sense of being addressed to a person’s
own educational aspirations and regardless of extrinsic ends attached to
them. For this reason alone, there are grounds for defending the suppos-
edly Western idea of education for its own sake. In its worst institutional
manifestations, schooling is counter-educational whether in Western or in
African and other contexts of the global South. This has been prominently
exposed by philosophers and sociologists of education in the West and
elsewhere, who are neither apologists for dominant schooling practices nor
normally influential enough to see their own ideas enacted in educational
provision. If only philosophers of education enjoyed such influence!
The types of individualism opposed byMetz andWaghid in their defence
of African education’s more communitarian qualities represent a selection
of some elements of the individualist tradition. But as a strand in modern
Western thought, individualism comprises several tendencies, some at odds
with one another (see Lukes, 1973). Some educationally indefensible ex-
pressions of individualism should be, and indeed have been, rejected by
Western philosophers of education, but there are others which played a
historically progressive role in eroding the often tyrannical, patriarchal au-
thority of themonarchy, the church and the nobility. One of these, the notion
of respect for persons, of human dignity and the worth of each individual
human being as an end in herself, we would endorse as an underpinning
for a defensible conception of education, universally, but also as common
to most Western conceptions of education. Resting in part on this founda-
tional idea is the widespread support for some form of autonomy as an aim
of education, even if alternative terms like ‘agency’ are preferred and how-
ever autonomy might be qualified by insisting on locating the individual
in relation to others, both ontologically and also by relating it to defences
of moral and citizenship education. For Western philosophers of education
learning is social, unavoidably interactive.
By contrast, like the possessive individualism rightly opposed byWaghid,
the brand of individualism expressed in what Steven Lukes (1973) calls eco-
nomic individualism has found little if any support among philosophers of
education. Following its early defence by economists like Milton Fried-
man (1962), it finds its current expression in neo-liberal conceptions of the
learner as both an investment and a customer who pursues her preferences
by buying an education that will in turn enable her to take her place as
a competitive individual working for private profit, thus playing her part
in making the national economy more globally competitive than others.
We note, however, in passing, that the employability policy imperative in
Western schooling, though subject to strong critique by philosophers of
education, looks rather like one of the features of African philosophy of
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education, i.e. preparation for work (see, for example, Adeyemi and
Adeyinka, 2003, pp. 431–433).
Relatedly, political individualism would cast the individual citizen as
expressing her preferences by voting periodically, on the assumption that
the aggregated preferences of all such choosers is a rational way to select
leaders, whose performance would then be assessed by the electorate, who
periodically choose like customerswhether to retain those they have elected,
or to replace themwith a new set of rulers. Philosophers of educationwriting
about citizenship education do not favour such a conception of the citizen,
and have given much attention to the fostering of citizenship as disposed to
the common good.
The citizen as autonomous individual would, for some philosophers of
education, engage in a further form of individualism that Metz regards
as favoured by the practices and philosophies of education in the West,
i.e. in critical thinking. Metz describes this in a form that judges one’s
traditions in pursuit of self realisation and an own conception of the good.
But though most philosophical treatment of critical thinking as an aim of
education is not about encouraging people to make this kind of judgement,
this particular concern is also evident in another much debated thread in
philosophy of education in Britain and the USA that has elicited divergent
opinions. William Galston (1995) favours protecting diverse individuals
and groups rather than fostering choice. Thus inclusion is given priority
over critical reflection, which may undermine ways of life. By contrast,
AmyGutmann (1995) gives individual autonomy precedence over diversity,
arguing that future citizens should be taught to evaluate the different political
perspectives associated with different ways of life. Yet even this stance
hardly matchesMetz’s depiction of philosophy of education as encouraging
young people to judge their traditions.Wewill return to individual autonomy
and education for critique again, in our reconsideration of African education
as communitarianism.
5. COMMUNITY RECONSIDERED
By avoiding the pitfalls of individualism, African communitarianism is
apparently better equipped to be both a philosophical foundation for educa-
tion and the basis for a consensual approach to addressing the continent’s
problems. We see several problems with philosophy of education thus de-
lineated, some arising if it is to be opposed to individualism in those forms
accurately attributable to its interpretation and practice in the West, some
from the account of community in Africa described above, and some from
apparent assumptions about the causes of human suffering and the kind
of political action required to address it. Some elements of communitarian
thought may not be conducive to the political or educational goals sought
by Waghid and need to be tempered by elements of individualism.
What is ‘the community’, when applied to the vast continent of Africa
in the early 21st century? To an extent one can attach the concept to small,
local communities in neighbourhoods or villages or to organisations whose
members might know each other, even sometimes to imagined communities
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when particular issues and problems prompt a unified response. To these
one can attribute the features of community admired for their sociality,
shared identity and solidarity. Such communities are more readily imag-
ined on all continents either on a small and specific scale or in historical
contexts prior to modernity, globalisation and the post-colonial condition
that characterises almost all societies now, notably Britain and most of the
West. There are a few exceptions to this generalisation, like North Korea,
perhaps. Yet, even in their mainly bygone more pristine conditions, the
rurally rooted communities of occidental pre-modernity were not found
objects and neither are those of contemporary Africa. Their composition,
internal relationships, structures and hierarchies are the products of power,
struggle and negotiation. Some members have the power to influence deci-
sions more than others. Viewed from a minimally sociological perspective
all are marked by at least some structured inequalities and their membership
and traditions are at least in part a product of the power of those who grant
themselves the right to determine them. Communities can be oppressive
and exploitative. So, while we support Waghid’s account of deliberation
with its emphasis on listening to the other, in practice when deliberation
appeals to the good of the community it is often likely to favour its dominant
members.
Communities are not only inclined to marginalise some of their members
from within, as has been the experience of gays in some parts of Africa and
theWest. If right acts are those that value harmony and respect relationships
of identity and solidarity (Metz, 2009, p. 191; see alsoMetz, 2007, where he
lays the groundwork for an African moral theory), what are the implications
for those not of the community? If an educated person has acquired a com-
munitarian sense of responsibility toward kin and community, the virtues
of ‘mutual respect, sincerity, justice and moral sensitivity’ rightly prized by
Waghid amount to too little if thus confined. Like care, empathy and com-
passion are biased if limited to only some. After all, we tend to empathise
to a greater extent with those close to us: with family members, members
of our primary group, close friends, perhaps companion animals, and those
whose personal needs and concerns are similar to our own, though this is
not invariably or exclusively the case. Moreover, why should the moral
maturity and refinement of an ‘educated person’ be measured in this narrow
communitarian sense?5
Waghid also leaves unaddressed the reality of many, if not most, tradi-
tional societies or communities, where duty and responsibility are charac-
teristically understood, for example, as an obligation to obey or as a duty
of unquestioning loyalty. It is unclear whether acting out of such a sense of
duty or responsibility will precipitate moral maturation, or the development
of moral maturity and refinement.
When extended beyond the community, kith and kin, what kind of en-
gagement, including political action, might an African philosophy of edu-
cation prepare persons for, given the emphasis that Waghid places on both
consensus and deliberation, the latter a concept much debated in Western
democratic theory, on which his analysis draws.We have no problem recog-
nising the significance of deliberation and dialogue in (any) philosophy of
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education: our concern arises with the use of ‘consensual’ and, again, with
the narrow communitarianism at work in this qualification of ‘dialogue’.
It is one thing to recognise the value of consensus in small-scale, fragile
societies and communities; it is quite another to see it as a significant if not
essential component of African philosophy of education, especially when
applied to citizenship education. It is easier to associate this account of com-
munity with such examples than with much larger and more diverse groups,
like nation states. What is the community in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo or Nigeria, large, ethnically diverse and sometimes fractured as they
are?
One could ask whether Africa’s ‘misery’ might not in part be more
difficult to address because of the preoccupation on the African continent
with communalism—which underlies obedience to authority, ancestors and
traditional leaders—and arguably also of the ‘tyranny of consensus’. Our
concern here is that ‘palaver democracy’,6 which aims at agreement, is
considerably less democratic than a system—educational or political—that
encourages dissent and critical interrogation. Similarly, what in practice has
the contribution of ubuntu been ‘towards achieving democratic justice on
the African continent’ (p. 2)? While communalism and ubuntumay well be
forces for good at times, an over-emphasis on their worth as distinctive of
African ways is made at the expense of a fuller explanatory picture of the
causes of misery, which include contemporary corruption, autocratic rule,
and the curse of debt traps that tax-evading foreign corporations exploit to
shore up undemocratic regimes, sometimes with the connivance of Western
governments.
Waghid attributes lapses in African humanism evident in events of hu-
man catastrophe in Africa like genocide to ‘sporadic surges of atomistic
individualism that bring a concern for human welfare into conflict with
other despotic and patriarchal imperatives, such as to dominate and exclude
people from authentic ways of living—that is, peace, stability and pros-
perity. However, despite the lapses in living ethically, African cultures are
still concerned innately with living worthwhile lives . . . ’ (p. 46). We don’t
necessarily question this latter claim about traditional African culture, but
we do doubt the explanatory power of atomistic individualism thus invoked
to explain catastrophe on the continent. We know of no credible theorist
of social or political action, Western or otherwise, who would subscribe
to such an account, whatever role it might have played as an underlying
tendency in some expressions of enlightenment thought that are now thor-
oughly discredited. Moreover, to suggest that individual autonomy ought to
have a place in depictions of democratic deliberation and action in Africa
does not commit one to advocate pursuit of responsible self-determination
depicted as the acts of atomistic, isolated individuals. No plausible theory of
political action would attribute explanatory value to ‘mere acts of individ-
ualised activity’ (Waghid, 2014, p. 28) by individual selves acting without
others. Conflict and suffering on all continents are very rarely attributable
solely to the acts of individuals. That they are is an assumption that flies in
the face of well-established explanations of conflict, which is structurally
caused.
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6. (PHILOSOPHY OF) EDUCATION: WESTERN, AFRICAN, GLOBAL
In his penultimate concluding remark Metz says, somewhat cryptically: ‘as
someone who believes that those in the African tradition often miss out
on some kernels of truth in Euro-American viewpoints, particularly with
regard to the value of knowledge for its own sake . . . , I am also partial
to the idea that those in Africa should become less African’ (2015, p. 8).
Our argument has suggested that elements of philosophy of education in
the West, centrally a qualified notion of critical autonomy, would be of
value in African education. In doing so we do not reject the relevance of
certain forms of community to the aims of education, and so to educational
practice, especially given the growing influence of neo-liberal conceptions
of the individual on Western schooling. In fact, philosophy of education
in the West is not short of either defenders of community or critics of
neo-liberal influences on education policy and practice, in and beyond the
West.
But what is at stake, for the practice of philosophy of education, when
we make remarks like these? To some extent, we are puzzled by what
the ultimate point is of exchanges like the one addressed here, supposedly
between Western and African philosophy of education; what resolution
might be either desired or possible? In posing these questions we hasten
to add that trying to think post-colonially about the state of philosophy of
education at the 50th anniversary of the PESGB neither requires nor permits
Western triumphalism, just as it inevitably sets limits to a retrieval of pre-
colonial African traditions. We have no wish to defend the West—which
has so much to answer for given its history of colonialism and its role
in enduring neo-colonialism—against the rest in a partisan dispute about
which part of the globe might have the best conception of aims of education,
whether suited to local conditions or to cross-continental circumstances.We
think that neither Metz norWaghid seeks the latter kind of resolution either.
In comparative philosophy of education of this kind, several tendencies
come into play. Metz (2015) makes a strong case for his claim that there
is some truth in geographical labels like ‘Western’ and ‘African’ and that
they plausibly pick out properties like ‘individualist’ and ‘communitarian’;
as a rough generalisation we don’t necessarily disagree, provided we recog-
nise that these categories are neither ontologically nor analytically stable.
As we have argued, much remains to be said about what content such
geographical characterisations may be given. In filling out such content,
comparison across space becomes mixed in turn into comparison across
time: past African traditions, meanings and educational practices (which
may not be all that different from pre-industrial revolution Western tra-
ditions and education) are commonly compared with selected elements of
contemporary Western philosophy of education, which is sometimes col-
lapsed into Western and indeed increasingly global schooling practices.
Conceptual analysis through examination of the philosophical treatment or
the common, everyday use of key educational terms can shade into their
reconstruction, sometimes across the regions labelledWest and Africa, such
reconstruction being advanced in advocating change in public conceptions
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of social and educational discourses and practices. Anthropological descrip-
tion is not the same as philosophical critique and reconstruction, but they
are best recognised as different activities which might inform each other,
and not treated as equivalent or interchangeable.
Our final concern about the dangers of doing philosophy of education
across continents, between the West and Africa as well as the global South
in general, is that attending to the apparent differences between them by
overemphasising cultural differences, whether in their educational or social
or political traditions (all contestable) distracts attention from the common
problems they face at the hands of global capital, which is now so inter-
nationalised that it would be a serious conceptual and strategic error to
regard it as either a solely Western force or as indistinguishable from what
philosophers of education have to say on its appropriation of education to
the ends that concern Metz. As a contemporary manifestation of capitalism,
neo-liberal forces in education sponsor schooling that is similarly indefen-
sible for all those thus schooled, globally. This is schooling not for its own
sake, aimed at well being or flourishing, at promoting individual autonomy,
democracy, social justice, community or citizenship, but at individual and
national competitiveness, aided by high stakes testing and league tables. It
is aimed at preparation for employability in work that is increasingly less
secure and for low wages, or for structured under- and unemployment, im-
plicated in turn in growing inequality both within and across countries and
continents. Taking a culturalist line on the major challenges that face ed-
ucation and so philosophers of education globally, distracts attention from
these shared problems. Marx’s contribution to global thought, while West-
ern in origin because he lived and wrote there, has understandably inspired
resistance to colonialism in Africa and elsewhere. We do well to bear in
mind the emphasis in that Western and global tradition of thought on the
material conditions in which human beings live and educate.
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NOTES
1. Waghid’s is an articulation and defence of African philosophy of education from within drawing
on elements of Western philosophy, while Metz’s is a critique of Western philosophy of education
from an African perspective, arguing that the former needs to be more like the latter.
2. Like the question of whether one can really speak of indigenous or African knowledge and its
construction within African traditions, further discussion of this account of African rationality is
beyond the scope of the present paper.
3. See Hayden, 2012 for an empirical study of the themes, philosophers, theorists and concepts studied
by philosophers of education whose work was published in four leading journals published in
English between 2000 and 2010. ‘Community’ is one of the 25 most frequently referenced concepts
in the four ‘Western’ philosophy of education journals, though this may indicate interest rather than
allegiance to any particular account of community.
4. We will not here discuss the other individualist features that Metz attributes to Western schooling,
such as a set curriculum taught by professional instructors, though we would want to defend them
in some form.
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5. We acknowledge that Waghid seems to oscillate between this narrow sense and a wider, more
encompassing understanding of communitarianism. (This is especially noteworthy in his discussion
on pp. 21–28, where he pays tribute to the work of Sandel (1982), Walzer (1983) and Taylor (1991),
before reiterating his intellectual debt to Gyekye.) Our concern is not with the communitarianisms of
Sandel, Walzer and Taylor—but clearly the question arises what would be left of a characteristically
African philosophy of education in the defence of such a wider use?
6. ‘The elders sit under the big trees, and talk until they agree’ (Wiredu, 2000, p. 374; Wiredu refers to
a quote by Julius Nyerere to substantiate his claim that ‘decision by consensus was often the order
in African deliberations’; see Waghid, 2014, p. 56).
REFERENCES
Adeyemi, M. and Adeyinka, A. (2003) The Principles and Content of African Traditional Education.
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 35.4, pp. 425–440.
Dearden, R. (1972) Autonomy and Education, in R. Dearden, P. Hirst and R. Peters (eds.) Education
and the Development of Reason (London, Routledge).
Friedman, M. (1962) Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago, University of Chicago Press).
Galston, W. (1995) Two Concepts of Liberalism. Ethics, 105.3, pp. 516–534.
Gutmann, A. (1995) Civic Education and Social Diversity. Ethics, 105.3, pp. 557–579.
Gyekye, K. (1997) Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience
(Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Hayden, M.J. (2012) What Do Philosophers of Education Do? An Empirical Study of Philosophy
of Education Journals. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 31, pp. 1–27.
Kymlicka, W. (1989) Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality. Ethics, 99.4, pp. 883–905.
Lukes, S. (1973) Individualism (New York, Harper & Row).
Metz, T. (2007) Toward an African Moral Theory. Journal of Political Philosophy, 15.3, pp. 321–
341.
Metz, T. (2009) The Final Ends of Higher Education in Light of an African Moral Theory. Journal
of Philosophy of Education, 43.2, pp. 179–201.
Metz, T. (2015) How the West was One: The Western as Individualist, the African as Com-
munitarian. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 47.11, pp. 1175–1184. Available online at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00131857.2014.991502.
Oladipo, O. (1992) The Idea of African Philosophy: A Critical Study of the Major Orientations in
Contemporary African Philosophy (Ibadan, Molecular Publishers).
Sandel, M. (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Smith, R. (1997) The Education of Autonomous Citizens, in D. Bridges (ed.) Education, Autonomy
and Democratic Citizenship (London, Routledge).
Standish, P. (1999) Education without Aims? in R. Marples (ed.) The Aims of Education (London,
Routledge).
Taylor, C. (1991) The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press).
Waghid, Y. (2014) African Philosophy of Education Reconsidered: On Being Human (London &
New York, Routledge).
Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice (New York, Basic Books).
White, J. (1982) The Aims of Education Restated (London, Routledge).
Wiredu, K. (2000) Democracy and Consensus in Traditional African Politics: A Plea for a Non-
Party Polity, in P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux (eds.) Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings
(Oxford, Oxford University Press Southern Africa).
Wiredu, K. (2004) Prolegomena to an African Philosophy of Education. South African Journal of
Higher Education, 18.3, pp. 17–26.
C© 2016 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.
